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kets considered in the sample and the existence of a common trend
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1. Introduction
Following reforms introduced in the organization of electricity mar-
kets almost everywhere, electricity prices are now determined in reg-
ulated (generally, Pool) markets where prices are strongly aﬀected by
the impossibility to arbitrage between time and space. As a result
these prices have become very volatile. Yet, time series of current
electricity prices diﬀer quite substantially from prices determined in
markets for ﬁnancial assets and other type of commodities since elec-
tricity cannot be treated like a stock. Electricity prices have speciﬁc
and somehow unique characteristics (e.g. multiple seasonalities, spikes,
heteroschedasticity, periodicities) that motivate the use of appropri-
ate time series modelling to study the speciﬁc features of their time
pattern and to evaluate how prices are aﬀected by temporal demand-
supply imbalances, seasonality, transmission congestion and, to a lesser
extent, by the features of the mechanism that generates the data (type
of auction employed, price rule, degree of market concentration, etc.).
In Europe the reorganization of the electricity sector started with the
establishment of the England and Wales Pool market in 1991 and it is
still ongoing. The newly created European national markets show sev-
eral similarities in the architecture of the market and quite signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the conditions aﬀecting consumption as well as gener-
ation technology. Despite the existence of physical interconnections
that allows a signiﬁcant cross-border trade among countries, so far Eu-
ropean prices series have been studied ignoring the issue represented
by a possible interdependency in the dynamics of prices formed in (at
least) neighboring markets. Indeed, to our knowledge no study to date
has examined electricity price interdependencies at the European level.
Filling this gap is the primary motivation of this paper. In order to
do so, we conduct a multivariate dynamic analysis of prices generated
by four major European electricity pools (Germany, France, Austria,
Netherlands). Consistently with previous analyses, European data in-
spection reveal the presence of spikes and jumps, heteroschedasticity
and strong seasonalities. We therefore make use of estimators and tests
robust to departures from gaussianity, homoschedasticity and station-
arity in diﬀerences. Our results question the most commonly reported
ﬁnding of mean reversion and, implicitly, of no integration of European
prices. On the contrary, our tests indicate the presence of strong inte-
gration among the four markets and the presence of a common trend
among electricity prices. We found that this common trend is in turn
cointegrated with the oil price. The latter result appears to be relevant
also in the context of the discussion of eﬃcient hedging instruments to
be used by medium-long term investors.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the main
characteristics – both institutional and technical – of some wholesaleDEREGULATED WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES IN EUROPE 3
European markets for which data are available. In section 3 a review of
previous works on time series analysis of electricity prices is discussed.
In section 4, which is divided into subsections, we present the empirical
models and the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2. The European electricity markets
In this section we describe some characteristics of the European elec-
tricity exchanges considered in our sample: Nord Pool, Austria, France,
Germany, Netherlands for a sample period ranging from March 2002
to June 2006. Spain and Italy are also considered for reference since
they present some speciﬁc characteristics. We emphasise the features
of each national electricity industry and the eﬀects produced by the
two European Electricity Directives (1996 and 2003) that indicated
the general prescriptions for the reorganisation of the industry.
Electricity market reform has been ﬁrst introduced in Chile (1987)
and since then it has spread to many areas of the world. The England
and Wales (E&W) Electricity Pool market (1991) is the ﬁrst European
experience that completed the liberalization of the British electricity
industry. More generally the liberalisation of the electricity industry
followed a number of key steps: the unbundling of previously vertically
integrated activities (generation, transmission, distribution and retail
supply); the introduction of new institutions such as wholesale and re-
tail competitive markets, with free entry of generators and suppliers;
the creation of an independent national regulator who guarantees third
party network access to the (still monopolised) transmission and distri-
bution lines. Privatisation of vertically integrated monopolistic suppli-
ers previously existing, was not explicitly required by the two European
Directives
1. Both the EU Directives focused on the unbundling of the
industry to separate the potentially competitive generation and sup-
ply activities from the natural monopoly activities (transmission and
distribution). The second Directive (2003) in particular introduced a
stronger regulation of access to networks and set a minimum standard
timetable for the full opening of local markets.
The reorganisation and new regulation of the electricity industry
have been driven by some major developments in the technology that
took place in the 70s and 80s. First we should mention the introduction
of new combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT) plants that are relatively
small sized (350 MW to 450 MW), have short constructions times and
require a small investment. Moreover, CCGT units are highly eﬃcient
and have lower marginal costs than old open-cycle gas turbine plants.
It follows that old gas plants are used for peak hours and to provide
reserve, whereas CCGT plants can be used in hours of low demand.
Notably, they compete in the most proﬁtable portion of supply, namely
1UK and Portugal have realised extensive privatisation programs whereas in Italy
we had only partial privatisation. France maintains a public ownership structure.4 B. BOSCO, L. PARISIO, M. PELAGATTI, F. BALDI
the base-load, previously dominated by hydro and nuclear production.
Both hydro and nuclear plants created a strong barrier to competi-
tion since they are capital-intensive and are constrained respectively
by the location and the national legislation. CCGT plants have been
considered to break the barriers to new entry in the industry. These
technological innovations attracted new investment in the generation
industry and rendered the generation of electricity potentially compet-
itive.
The presence of new independent power producers alongside the old
(ex)monopolist, introduced a problem of coordination between time
varying demand and supply of a physical good like electricity which is
not storable. Coordination was not an issue in the old integrated indus-
try where the sole producer was also responsible for transmission and
distribution and was endowed with all the relevant information about
demand and supply. Therefore the new liberalised market structure
requires a central mechanism to be introduced in order to continuously
match demand and supply. In the countries considered in our sample
the exchange of physical electricity is organized as a competitive whole-
sale spot market or wholesale auction. The introduction of a wholesale
market of electricity poses some problems of market architecture and
design to regulators and it has also stimulated sophisticated theoretical
research. In the ﬁrst place, it must be decided whether to opt for a
centralized Pool or for a decentralized market. In the ﬁrst case, all the
electricity must be allocated through a mandatory Pool; this implies
that bilateral contracts are not allowed. All operators, both on the
demand and on the supply side, submit hourly bids (half-hourly bids
in the old UK&W Pool) and the market operator allocates quantities
by a procedure that minimizes the cost of despatch. A decentralized
electricity market like NETA (UK after 2001), on the contrary, is orga-
nized as a series of bilateral forwards and future markets with a number
of power exchanges for voluntary trading which are open until shortly
before delivery. The advantages of a Pool market over a decentralized
one is that demand and supply are continuously matched so that all
coordination problems disappear. Advocates of the decentralized mar-
ket structure emphasize, however, that the Pool may be aﬀected by
strategic bidding on the part of those operators having some market
power and, as a consequence, the Pool prices do not generally reveal
costs. Whilst the issue is still open at the theoretical level, on the
empirical side we ﬁnd many examples, especially in Europe, of non-
mandatory electricity Pools where bilateral contracts are allowed. This
choice is probably motivated by the desire to capture the main advan-
tages of the two alternative organization schemes. Electricity markets
considered in our paper are all non-mandatory. Producers and con-
sumers/distributors are allowed to engage in bilateral contracts for theDEREGULATED WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES IN EUROPE 5
short or long term exchange of electricity. The quantity traded bilat-
erally is usually included in the total supply recorded in the exchange
as zero price oﬀers. Due to this characteristic, the degree of liquidity
of the Pool market, is deﬁned as the ratio between electricity traded in
the Pool and the total electricity supplied.
All the electricity Pools we consider work as multi-unit uniform price
auctions: generators and buyers submit price/quantity oﬀers which are
aggregated by the market operator in order to form a supply curve and
a demand (where demand side bidding is allowed) respectively. The
equilibrium price and quantity are then determined by the standard
crossing condition. Producers who bid a price less or equal to the equi-
librium price are included in the production program for the next day.
The total quantity sold by all despatched units is paid the equilibrium
System Marginal Price (SMP) deﬁned as the bid made by the marginal
unit selected by the mechanism.
The exchanges we consider work ﬁrst on a day-ahead basis. Day-
ahead markets are mainly designed for planning purposes and, as the
time of delivery gets closer, positive or negative deviations from the
planned production are managed in a number of ﬁne-tuning markets.
These ﬁne-tuning or intra-day markets are of considerably smaller size
than the day-ahead market. In the real time, it is the transmission
system operator who is responsible for the balance of demand and
supply.
A second common characteristic of European exchanges considered
is the existence of demand side bidding. However, the opening of the
bidding process to demand has not proceeded at a common pace in all
countries. Indeed, following the European Directive 2003/54/EC, all
customers have to be considered as eligible by 1/7/2007. At present,
however, in almost all markets considered, only large (mainly indus-
trial) consumers and distributors are allowed to present the demand
bids.
The EU Electricity Directive 2003/54 requires each country to im-
plement both legal and functional unbundling for transmission and
distribution System Operators. This rule is expected to lead to non-
discriminatory network access with tariﬀs broadly reﬂecting costs. Al-
though the provisions of the Directive have usually been transposed
into national laws, it is not clear whether network companies have yet
modiﬁed all aspects of their organization to comply with the new law.
The requirement to have legally unbundled and independently managed
transmission system operators (TSO) should have been implemented
by 1 July 2004. All the countries considered have accomplished to the
legal unbundling of network operators, but in some cases there is still
overlap between ownership of the TSO and ownership of one (usually
the former monopolist) electricity supplier.6 B. BOSCO, L. PARISIO, M. PELAGATTI, F. BALDI
The auction-based dispatching does not take transmission conditions
into account and so congestions may occur both in the internal market
and across-border. The main features of the mechanisms implemented
to manage congestions is that they are market-based. When internal
congestion occurs on the transmission line the market operator together
with the TSO try and relieve it at the minimum possible cost in a mar-
ket based way. However, the allocation of the congestion costs may be
performed in more than one method. One substantial diﬀerence de-
pends upon whether or not locational prices are calculated directly in
the electricity day-ahead market. Alternatively, separate markets for
the congestion management may be implemented when the day-ahead
market allocations result unfeasible. Zonal prices prevailed in the Nord
Pool and in Italy. Zonal pricing is thought to combine a good perfor-
mance in sending signals to the market together with a fairly simple
implementation. The resolution of bottlenecks is managed by the split-
ting of markets into zones characterized by diﬀerent equilibrium prices.
In the congested area the price is higher than the one prevailing in the
non-congested area. The determination of the diﬀerent zones is man-
aged diﬀerently across markets. For example, within Norway and at
the interconnections between the Nordic countries price mechanisms
are used to relieve grid congestion (bottlenecks) resulting in diﬀerent
Elspot area prices. In Austria, which is an important transit country,
congestion on the network occurs because of a high quota of energy
that goes through the lines in order to be delivered abroad. There-
fore, the network capacity in this country is extremely valuable and
as a result network access tariﬀs are settled at the highest level with
respect to other countries. On the contrary, within Sweden, Finland,
and Denmark, grid congestion is managed by counter-trade purchases
b a s e do nb i d sf r o mg e n e r a t o r s .
The electricity markets considered diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their under-
lying production structure. This is a very important point since all
the issues related to the market design become less severe when the
industry is more competitive. It is well known that electricity can
be generated in a variety of ways and using diﬀerent types of input,
which can be either renewable or not-renewable. The cost of the unit
of energy supplied in a country depends upon the market size and the
diﬀerent kinds of plants producing in a given hour. The shape of the
system marginal cost function is therefore inﬂuenced by the productive
mix of the generating industry. On the other hand the technological
features are also thought to inﬂuence the market power of ﬁrms, their
strategic behaviour and consequently the SMP. For that reason some
data about the industry structure must be considered into the analysis.
Figure 1 contains data on generation sources in the European countries

























Figure 1. Data on production technologies (average
2000-2004)
The Nord Pool comprises the last four countries listed in Figure 1; it
links together Norway, which is the founding country (1993), Sweden,
who joined in 1996, Finland (1998) and the western part of Denmark
(1999). We notice that an high percentage of Nord Pool’s total pro-
duction is generated by hydro and nuclear plants with limited recourse
to gas and coal. In the Austrian market hydro plants cover on aver-
age the 69% of total production. Germany, Spain, Sweden and espe-
cially France have a large nuclear production whereas Spain and France
present similar ﬁgures on hydroelectric production. Netherlands and
Germany have a small quota of hydroelectric production. Finally, Italy
and Netherlands rely mainly on gas-ﬁred plants.
Another important feature of the electricity market is the level of
concentration in the industry. This can be measured by two main indi-
cators. First we consider the number of companies with a market share
of at least 5% and secondly we consider the market share of the largest
three producers. A third variable that we list in Table 1 measures the
weight of the pool market on the total energy exchanged/consumed in
a country. This liquidity multiple is very important because all Pool
markets considered in our sample are non mandatory so that part of
the total energy is exchanged through bilateral contracts at a price
which is normally diﬀerent from the SMP. The larger is the liquidity
multiple for that market, the more representative is the SMP of the
“price for electricity”.8 B. BOSCO, L. PARISIO, M. PELAGATTI, F. BALDI
Table 1. Level of concentration and liquidity multiple
of European exchanges
Largest producer Total % share
% share of largest
Country by capacity 3 producers Liquidity
Austria (EXAA, 2002) 45 75 3
Scandinavia (Nord Pool, 1993) 15 40 42
France (Power Next, 2001) 85 95 3
Germany (EEX, 2002) 30 70 11
Italy (IPEX, 2004) 55 75 21
Netherlands (APX, 1999) 25 65 12
Spain (OMEL, 1998) 40 80 92
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2005)
The French market is characterized by the highest level of concentra-
tion with a dominant position of EDF. The French Pool market “Power
Next” accounts for a very small quota of total energy consumed. This
is also the case of Germany where only a small portion of energy is
traded on EEX (11%). All the other markets listed in Table 1 appear
to be fairly concentrated and to have a quite low liquidity ratio. There
are two exceptions of a opposite sign: the Spanish exchange has a very
large liquidity share and it has an oligopolistic structure. Nord Pool,
on the contrary, appears to have a more competitive structure and a
relatively high liquidity share.
From Table 1 we may conclude that across European countries the
level of concentration in generation is still high and this creates the
scope for market power and the ability to inﬂuence prices. Contrary
to expectations, the strong position of incumbent operators has not
been eroded in a signiﬁcant way by investments in generation made by
new entrants. Complex planning procedures and the scarcity of suit-
able sites have also been named as reasons why the building of new
power plants does not take place. Uncertainties associated with the
power exchanges have also been considered as entry barriers. Genera-
tion is a key issue for competition in the European electricity markets.
The generators, due to the characteristics of the electricity market (the
non-storability of electricity, the high inelasticity of demand, a very
wide spectrum of costs of production and a price equal to the highest
accepted oﬀer (SMP) made in power exchanges), are able to inﬂuence
prices through the use of generation capacity available to them, in par-
ticular by either withdrawing capacity (which may force recourse to
more expensive sources of supply) or by imposing prices when their
supply are indispensable to meet demand. In the ﬁrst case, the with-
drawal of capacity is proﬁtable if the cost of not producing with some
units is more than compensated by the increase in SMP. A large port-
folio of low-cost plants facilitates this strategy. In the second case, itDEREGULATED WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES IN EUROPE 9
is possible to raise SMP even with a relatively small portfolio of plants
depending on other oﬀer constraints (e.g. the location of units). The
behaviour of generators thus can impact signiﬁcantly on the level of
prices, even at a level of lower concentration than in other sectors.
Another relevant feature to be considered as an explanatory variable
of price co-movements among European exchanges is the level of in-
tegration of local Pools. Indeed, there are interconnecting lines that
allow for the cross-border exchange of electricity that is expected to
ﬂow from low price areas toward high price areas. The goal of inte-
gration of European electricity markets will be in fact achieved when
the energy ﬂows will determine a perfect convergence of Pool prices
across European countries. The following Table 2 lists the existing in-
terconnections among the exchanges considered and the status of the
interconnection, namely the frequency with which congestion occurs.
In fact, when congestion occurs in a particular hour, price convergence
is not possible and the two local markets are separated.
Table 2. Capacity of interconnectors and frequency of congestion
Country Capacity in winter (MW)
Exp. Imp. 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 Congested
Powernext EEX 2250 2550 2850 frequently
EEX Powernext 4600 5600 5600 never
EEX APX 3900 3800 3800 frequently
APX EEX 2700 3000 3000 seldom
EEX EXAA 1200 1600 1600 never
EXAA EEX 1500 1400 1400 never
Nord Pool EEX 1010 1150 1150 frequently
EEX Nord Pool 920 1150 1150 occasionally
3. Time series analyses of electricity prices
The structural changes introduced in last decade in the organization
of electricity markets have stimulated empirical studies of electricity
price dynamics. The main elements emerging from some of these stud-
ies are summarized in Table 3.10 B. BOSCO, L. PARISIO, M. PELAGATTI, F. BALDI





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As it is apparent from Table 3, the initial objective of these analyses
was to characterize and explain the high degree of autocorrelation and
seasonality of power prices and, in some cases, to address some salient
issues useful to the valuation and hedging of power-based ﬁnancial con-
tracts. A common trait of this literature is the adoption of a sort of
two-step procedure. A preliminary data analysis is initially conducted
in order to gauge from data inspection the main characteristics of the
dynamics of the electricity prices. On the basis of this examination it
is almost invariably recognized that the models used in the second step
for the time series analysis of spot prices have to integrate seasonality
and reﬂect phenomena such as mean reversion, high price-dependent
volatility and leptokurtosis. For example, Lucia et al. (2002) present
a model which should permit the deﬁnition of analytical formulae for
derivative pricing. They employ seasonal dummies and sinusoidal func-
tions to deal with seasonality plus an AR(1) autocorrelation structure.12 B. BOSCO, L. PARISIO, M. PELAGATTI, F. BALDI
In his paper Bahnot (2000), using U.S. wholesale transaction prices
recorded from 1 January 1995 to 1 June 1998, discovered that the sea-
sonal means for peak and oﬀ-peak prices exhibit signiﬁcant variation
across the 12 months and across the delivery points. He also shows that
the price behavior changes with each regional market, so that a ﬁrm
that seeks to value or hedge power-based contracts must use instru-
ments tailored for the region in which it operates. The issue of season-
ality was considered also in other papers. Real-time balancing and de-
pendency on cyclical demand impose several diﬀerent seasonal pattern
to electricity prices (within day, week, year) almost everywhere. Dei-
dersen and Tr¨ uck (2002) study price series for Germany, New Zealand
and Spain and report strong intra-day pattern and peak during mid-
day. Moreover, monthly mean prices are higher during daytime and
weekly seasonal patterns show the presence of weekend eﬀects. Also
Knittel et al. (2005), using a model in which the mean was assumed
to be time dependent, found that Californian electricity prices show
intra-day seasonality and ”summer” (rather than winter) eﬀect. An-
nual seasonality was also found with winter prices always higher than
prices recorded in other seasons. On the contrary, mixed evidence was
obtained by Wilkinson et al. (2002) who use Australian data and con-
duct a non-parametric test of seasonality (peak and oﬀ-peak prices)
and of log-normality. In their estimations the null hypothesis of equal
day eﬀects was rejected for some sub-sample periods and not rejected
for some other periods.
Storage and transmission problems and the need for markets to be
balanced in real time are responsible of an unusually high volatility
of electricity prices accompanied by the presence of spikes and jumps.
This stimulated speciﬁc research. All the above reported empirical ev-
idence coincides in stressing that there is a strong correlation between
the standard deviation and the mean price making the volatility de-
pendent on the price level. This means that price series exhibit some
volatility clustering making models for conditional heteroskedasticity
opportune. When demand approaches and exceeds the limits of the sys-
tem generation capacity, prices are high and more volatile. Escribano
et al. (2002) use average daily prices of several markets and propose
a general and ﬂexible model that allows for deterministic seasonality,
mean reversion, jumps and conditional heteroskedasticity. They use six
nested versions of their model to analyze price behavior in the above
markets. Results indicate that AR(1) and GARCH (1,1) with jumps
perform better than other versions. Koopman et al. (2006) use Eu-
ropean data. They argue that the heteroskedasticity of prices can be
correctly represented only when the conditional mean of the time series
is modeled by means of periodic autoregressive processes. Accordingly,
they proceed to model the seasonalities by means of sinusoids and week-
day dummies. PAR(1) models seem to ﬁt best their data. They ﬁndDEREGULATED WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES IN EUROPE 13
evidence of mean reversion in the stochastic part of the model and long
memory in the Nord-Pool prices. As for spikes and jumps, they are at-
tributed to sudden and strong increase in demand when supply is at the
limit of generation capacity or to an unexpected break down of large
enough assets. Depending on demand and supply conditions they can
also be negative. According to Deidersen and Tr¨ uck (2002) they are
less frequent in market with high level of hydropower generation. Still,
spikes are quite pervasive and it is the presence of spikes what makes
the forecasting properties of the models used in the literature rather
poor. These extreme values can be modeled in discrete time by using
stochastic process with leptokurtic marginal distributions or in contin-
uous time by introducing jumps in a Wiener process (see for example
Atkins et al. 2002). Bystr¨ om (2005) models extreme price changes in
the Nord-Pool and estimates tail quantiles by ﬁltering the return series
and then applying an extreme value theory model to the residuals. Like
in other studies, the performance of the estimates improves when the
model takes into account explicitly the time-of-the-year seasonality of
the data. An alternative procedure to predict price spikes is followed by
Mount et al. (2006) who proposed a recursive Log-Likelihood Function
of a regime-switching model with transition probabilities functions of
the load and reserve margins thereby introducing exogenous variables
in the analysis of price series.
A speciﬁc characteristic of price series was discovered to be mean
reversion. By mean reversion we mean the absence of stochastic trends
or martingale-like behavior of prices. Electricity prices do not behave
as martingales, and the non-deterministic part of the data generating
process does not seem to contain unit roots (e.g. no random walk like
behavior). When hourly prices go up then they have to move down-
wards again in a relatively short time. It is thought that they oscillate
around some ”equilibrium” mean (possibly deterministically time vary-
ing). This makes a crucial diﬀerence with ﬁnancial markets. The speed
of the reversion is quite informative also in regulatory terms because
it displays the time needed by the supply side of the market to react
to unanticipated events or the time necessary for the event to be over.
The mean reverting nature of electricity prices is generally explained
by market fundamentals. Commonly held opinion is that only mean
reverting models with jumps allow for brief price spikes (see below)
observed in price data and that only the short term mean reversion is
the result of seasonal patterns. In the long run electricity prices may
revert to some mean. Mean reversion and seasonality are integrated in
a model proposed by Lucia et al. (2002) where the price is decomposed
into a deterministic and a stochastic component the latter following a
Ohrnstein-Uhlenbeck mean reverting process with zero mean so that
price revert to the deterministic function. Using Italian daily data,14 B. BOSCO, L. PARISIO, M. PELAGATTI, F. BALDI
Bosco et al. (2006) estimate periodic time series models with exponen-
tial GARCH disturbance and leptokurtic distributions and compare
their performance with more classical ARMA-GARCH models. They
ﬁnd that much of the variability in the price series is explained by the
interactions between deterministic multiple seasonalities and that peri-
odic AR-GARCH models mimic well the feature of the stochastic part
of the price process.
All the above considerations refer to markets working in isolation.
Yet, when there are neighboring markets operating in national (or
super-national, such as the European market) systems, they may be
characterized by strong interdependencies because of limited storability
and transmission (Lucia et al., 2002). In fact volatility and interdepen-
dency might result from highly interconnected transmission systems
and transmission congestion. DeVany et al. (1999a,b) study electricity
price behavior for western U.S. markets and ﬁnd that all of oﬀ-peak
price series and most of peak price series are pair-wise cointegrated
and, contrary to Bahnot (2000), that prices show relatively rapid con-
vergence with respect to external shocks. Park et al. (2006) examine
relationships among 11 U.S. spot markets for the period February 1998
to December 2002 using peak working days ﬁrm prices (no week-end
data). They ﬁnd that the relationships among the markets vary by
time frame. In contemporaneous analysis markets are separated from
each other but at longer time frames (30 days) these separations dis-
appear even though electricity transmission between the regions is lim-
ited. This suggests that the relationships among markets are not only
a function of physical assets (e.g. transmission lines) but also a func-
tion of market rules and institutional arrangements as well as of factors
(e.g. oil price) aﬀecting in a similar or dissimilar way the markets or
factors that are peculiar to each market (e.g. generation technology).
Once again exogenous variables were explicitly introduced. As for Eu-
rope, Bower (2002), Boisselau (2004), Armostrong et al. (2005) and
Zachmann (2005) compare electricity prices at various European power
exchanges. The ﬁrst two papers study the properties of prices series
in some markets to ﬁnd evidence of some converging trends in average
prices. Armstrong et al. (2005) analyze the time pattern of diﬀeren-
tials in average prices in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain
from 2002 to 2004. They conclude that the hypothesis of some conver-
gence of average yearly prices was consistent with the data. Zachmann
(2005) starts from the idea that cross-border trade among national mar-
kets should drive prices to converge especially for those markets having
larger cross-border trade. Using hourly cross-border capacity auction
results at the Dutch-German and Danish-German border for the years
2002 to 2004 as well as internal spot prices, he estimates a time-varying
coeﬃcient model of the diﬀerence between domestic and import prices
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the deviation of the observed prices from a common unique price. The
behavior over time of this index indicates the speed of convergence of
national markets towards an integrated market obeying the “law of one
price”. His outcomes indicate that arbitrage opportunities seem to be
reduced but mainly because of progress made in the management of
cross-border capacity. Interdependencies are not considered and spikes
and jumps, and their repercussion from one market to the next, are
not easily interpreted.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Unit roots and cointegration in European electricity prices.
Most of the authors who analysed electricity prices in competitive mar-
kets have found that mean reversion was a distinguishing feature of
these time series (de Jong and Huisman 2002, Deisden and Tr¨ uck 2002,
Escribano et al. 2002, Huisman and Mahieu 2003, Koopman et al 2006,
Knittel and Roberts 2005, Lucia and Schwartz 2002, Park et al. 2006).
Bosco, Parisio and Pelagatti (2006), used a mean-reverting model for
modelling Italian electricity prices, but stated that, while mean rever-
sion may be a sensible approximation when a relatively short period of
time is considered (other features dominate the variance), it is hard to
believe that electricity process are not related to oil prices, which typi-
cally exhibit unit root behaviours. In fact, a great part of the European
electricity is produced by thermoelectric generators, and even if this
may be not true for some countries (France, Austria and Scandinavia),
many neighbouring countries are relatively well connected, reducing,
through arbitrage, the spread between prices. Although thermoelec-
tric plants are usually alimented by natural gas,
“there is intense competition between natural gas and other fuels on
the energy market. As the competitive price level is subject to constant
ﬂuctuations, supply contracts contain price adjustment clauses that
maintain a balance between the gas price and the price of competing
energies for the entire duration of the contract. In most cases, price
adjustment clauses are referred to fuel oil, reﬂecting the competitive
situation. Such fuel oil clauses peg the development of gas prices to
the development of fuel oil prices.”
2
Villar and Joutz (2006) ﬁnd evidence of cointegration between nat-
ural gas (Henry Hub) and crude oil (West Texas Intermediate) prices
in US, even though the deviation from the equilibrium relationship is
rather persistent.
So, if in the long run, European electricity prices tend to have a
constant mean ratio with the prices of gas, and this tends to have a
stable ratio with oil prices, than the logarithm of electricity prices of
many European countries and the logarithm of oil prices should be
2From the Verbundnetz Gas AG web site: http://www.vng.de/content/englisch/
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cointegrated with one common trend (null cointegration space rank
e q u a lt oo n e ) .
In some of the cited works on electricity prices, unit root tests were
carried out, but their results systematically rejected the unit root hy-
pothesis. Their evidence seems to contrast our conjectures about elec-
tricity prices behaviour, but there are good reasons for believing that
their results were not accurate.
(i) First of all, the sample periods considered included times of rela-
tively moderate oil price movements, and the high volatility of the other
components (seasonality, noise, outliers) turns the problem of ﬁnding
a unit root similar to the one of extracting a signal buried into a great
amount of noise. More formally, the random walk signal µt = µt−1+ηt,
with ηt white noise process with variance ασ2
ε, is observed with noise,
yt = µt +εt,w i t hεt white noise process with variance σ2
ε.I ti se a s yt o
see by taking ﬁrst diﬀerences, that yt has the ARIMA(0,1,1) represen-
tation (Harvey 1989, p.68 for example)
(1) (1 − B)yt =( 1+θ)ξt
with





and ξt white noise process with variance −σ2
ε/θ. When the noise vari-
ance is high compared to the signal variance, α is close to zero and the
MA coeﬃcient θ tends to one, making the MA operator on the right
hand side of (1) almost cancel out with the diﬀerence operator on the
left hand side. The small sample paths generated by process (1) in
such a situation are not distinguishable from white noise.
(ii) Secondly, it is well documented (Franses and Haldrup 1994) that
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test3 and Johansen’s cointegration
tests perform poorly when additive outliers and temporary changes are
present, and the test results are heavily biased towards rejection of the
unit root hypothesis.
(iii) Thirdly, electricity prices time series show very rich dynamics,
periodicities and multiple seasonalities (Koopman et al. 2006, Bosco et
al. 2006), high volatility and conditional heteroskedasticity (Escribano
et al. 2002, Bystr¨ om 2005), jumps and regime switches (Fabra and
Toro 2005, Huisman and Mahieu 2003). Nord Pool prices seems to be
also long memory (Koopman et al. 2006, Haldrup and Nielsen 2004).
Only Escribano et al. (2002) use unit root tests able to cope with
points (ii) and (iii), but problem (i) holds also in their study.
3The ADF test is the one used in most of the cited studies (Lucia and Schwartz
2002, Park et al. 2006, Haldrup and Nielsen 2004), only Knittel and Roberts (2005)
use the Phillips-Perron test.DEREGULATED WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES IN EUROPE 17
Suppose now that a stochastic I(1) trend µt is present in N time
series although buried in (possibly coloured) noise:
(3) yi,t = αi + βiµt + εi,t,t =1 ,...,T, i=1 ,...,N,
with εi,t I(0) noises uncorrelated or weakly correlated with each other4.
By taking the principal components (PC) we expect that if the trend
µt is the main source of correlation among the series, the ﬁrst principal
component should contain a partially de-noised version of µt. Asymp-
totically, the ﬁrst principal component converges to (a rescaled version
of) µt, since its O(T) variance dominates the O(1) variances of the I(0)
noises, and the common trend becomes the only source of correlation
among the series. Since (2) contain only a common trend and the last
N − 1 principal components are orthogonal to the ﬁrst, they (asymp-
totically) span the cointegration space, whose null space is spanned by
µt.
The use of principal components methods to cope with cointegration
is not new in literature: tests and estimates based on PC may be
found in Stock and Watson (1988), Harris (1997), Snell (1999) and,
more recently, Chigira (2006). In particular, in ﬁnite samples Chigira’s
(2006) test seems to perform better than Johansen’s, even under the
assumptions required by Johansen’s procedure, in spite of the weaker
assumptions needed by Chigira’s method.
In order to test our conjecture, we decided to apply PC and Chigira’s
cointegration test on the (logarithm of) electricity prices observed in
some of the most important exchanges in Europe: EEX (Germany),
Powernext (France), APX (Netherlands), EXAA (Austria). We kept
Nord Pool (Scandinavia) out of the analysis since the stochastic prop-
erties of its prices seem diﬀerent with respect to the other markets
(cf. Koopman et al. 2006 and Figure 2 ). This empirical considera-
tion is supported by the fact that most of the electricity exchanged in
this market is generated by hydro-plants, and its geographical position
makes connections with other European countries harder. In the ﬁrst
analysis we did not consider Omel (Spain) and IPEX (Italy), because
of their relatively short history (data are available since 2004).
Because of points (ii) and (iii) above, we decided to work on weekly
medians of the original hourly time series. The advantages of this
non linear transformation are twofold: it ﬁlters out many outliers and
makes cointegration tests more robust (Arranz and Escibano 2004), and
it cleans from the nuisance of interacting within-day and within-week
seasonalities (cf. Bosco et al. 2006). In principle, the analysis carried
4By weakly correlated we mean that ¯ εN,t = N−1 N
i=1 εi,t
p
− → 0a sN grows and
that the variance of ¯ εN,t is smaller than the variance of any εi,t for the dimension of
our sample. This is not an unrealistic requirement in our framework: it is equivalent
to ask that factors other than gas/oil prices tend to become less important the more
two countries are far away from each other.18 B. BOSCO, L. PARISIO, M. PELAGATTI, F. BALDI
out on weekly medians could be extended to any percentile or quantile,
but in this study we worked only on medians. The medians were taken
on a span starting from the ﬁrst hour of Mondays to the last hour of
Sundays and sample ranges from the 25th March 2002 (Monday) to the
4th June 2006 (Sunday).
In Figure 2 the weekly medians are depicted: the de-noising eﬀect
of the medians make the co-movements very clear. Even without a












Figure 2. Empirical studies of electricity price dynamics
Table 4 reports the main results of PC analysis performed on the
correlation matrix. The ﬁrst component takes account of almost 98%
of the total variance and the corresponding eigenvector puts weights
that are almost identical for each time series.
Table 4. Eigen-structure of the correlation matrix of
APX, EEX, EXA, Powernext.
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4
Eigenvalue 3.910006 0.045251 0.031012 0.013731
Variance Prop. 0.977501 0.011313 0.007753 0.003433
Cumulative Prop. 0.977501 0.988814 0.996567 1.000000
Eigenvectors:
Variable Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4
APX 0.499719 -0.199870 -0.834597 0.117395
EEX 0.500659 -0.421718 0.482612 0.581876
EXAA 0.502447 -0.226842 0.242895 -0.798180
POWER 0.497161 0.854838 0.107405 0.102698
If our conjecture is true the ﬁrst component should be an I(1) process,
while the other ones should be I(0), making the corresponding eigen-
vectors consistent estimates of cointegration vectors (cf. Harris 1997,
Snell 1999 and Chigira 2006). Figure 3 suggests that this may be the
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Figure 3. Principal components of APX, EEX, EXAA, Powernext.
Following Chigira (2006) we apply the I(1) tests of Phillips and Per-
ron (1988) and Breitung (2002) and the KPSS I(0) test of Kwiatkowski
et al. (1992) to the principal components. Chigira (2006) proposes a
sequential procedure for testing for the cointagration rank:
(1) set i =1 ,
(2) test the i-th PC for a unit root,
(3) if there is evidence against the unit root, set the cointegration
rank to N − i + 1 and stop, else increment i by one and go to
line 2.
The algorithm should be reversed if an I(0) test is used:
(1) set i = N,
(2) test the i-th PC for the absence of unit roots,
(3) if there is evidence for unit roots, set the cointegration rank to
i − 1 and stop, else decrement i by one and go to line 2.
The advantage of using Phillips-Perron and Breitung tests in the ﬁrst
procedure, when compared to the ADF test, is that they work under
much milder assumptions, allowing a wide class of weakly dependent
and heterogeneously distributed time series.
The results of the testing procedures applied to our data are summa-
rized in Table 5. All tests support the hypothesis of three cointegrating20 B. BOSCO, L. PARISIO, M. PELAGATTI, F. BALDI
relations, in fact only the ﬁrst PC seems to be I(1). For the I(1) test-
based procedure (second and third column), the process stops at the
second step, but we report all the test-statistics for completeness. Jo-
hansen’s tests (with unrestricted constant, not reported) applied to the
original series support stationarity of the system.
Table 5. Unit root and stationarity tests on the prin-
cipal components.
Phillips-Perron Breitung KPSSa
1st PC -2.812* 0.0709* 3.5039*
2nd PC -9.032* 0.0017* 0.1548*
3rd PC -9.360* 0.0033* 0.2661*
4th PC -16.542* 0.0005* 0.1376*
The tests have been performed using Newey-West variance
estimates with truncation lag 4. The 5% nominal critical
value for the PP test is -2.875, for Breitung’s test is 0.0100,
for the KPSS test is 0.463.
Figure 4 depicts the ﬁrst PC together with the weekly median of
the Brent log-price in Euro (standardized data). The two time series
clearly show a common tendency. The somewhat anomalous behaviour
of the ﬁrst PC in the latest part of the sample is the product of the
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Figure 4. First principal component with standardized
weekly median log-prices of a barrel of Brent in Euro.
We repeated the analysis including the Brent price in Euro. The
eigen-structure of the correlation matrix may be read from Table 6.
The cointegration tests are summarized in Table 7. The PP and
KPSS tests support the presence of a single common trend (four inde-
pendent cointegration vectors), while Breitung’s test suggests the pres-
ence of two common trends (three independent cointegration vectors).
5For an extensive account of this crisis refer to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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Table 6. Eigen-structure of the correlation matrix of
BRENT, APX, EEX, EXA, Powernext.
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Comp 5
Eigenvalue 4.568222 0.342267 0.045249 0.030531 0.013731
Variance Prop. 0.913644 0.068453 0.009050 0.006106 0.002746
Cumulative Prop. 0.913644 0.982098 0.991148 0.997254 1.000000
Eigenvectors:
Variable Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4 Vector 5
BRENT 0.394638 -0.918115 -0.002453 0.036327 -4.15E-05
APX 0.460105 0.165049 -0.201286 -0.840698 -0.117360
EEX 0.459435 0.217462 -0.420127 0.475956 -0.581884
EXAA 0.461371 0.208219 -0.225799 0.236019 0.798180
POWER 0.456751 0.197936 0.855562 0.098325 -0.102693
At a 10% level, also Breitung’s test would support the one-common-
trend hypothesis6. For completeness we carried out also Johansen’s
test (not reported) and, this time, the conclusions agree.
Table 7. Unit root and stationarity tests on the prin-
cipal components
Phillips-Perron Breitung KPSS*
1st PC -2.428* 0.0770* 1.0582*
2nd PC -4.764* 0.0137* 0.3024*
3rd PC -9.271* 0.0017* 0.2661*
4th PC -11.345* 0.0031* 0.1150*
5th PC -16.412* 0.0005* 0.1415*
The tests have been performed using Newey-West variance
estimates with truncation lag 19. The 5% nominal critical
value for the PP test is -2.875, for Breitung’s test is 0.0100,
for the KPSS test is 0.463.
4.2. Dynamic multivariate analysis. Building on the results of the
cointegration analysis we estimated a vector error correction model
(VECM). In order to determine the number of lags of the diﬀerenced
variables to be included in the model, we estimated unrestricted VARs
and looked at the diﬀerent information criteria. AIC suggested two
lags, while SC and HQ recommended just one7. For parsimony and
6For completeness we carried out ADF tests with lags chosen according to the
Schwarz information criterion and the conclusions were the same as the ones based
on the PP test. The ADF test for the second PC was very close to the 5% critical
value and extremely sensitive to the number of lags.
7AIC, SC and HQ stand for Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information
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for the better small sample properties of SC and HQ, we decided to
allow for only one lag. The modulus of the greatest root of the com-
panion matrix turned out to be almost equal to one (0.995) with the
second greatest root being 0.795, again supporting the hypothesis of
an integrated system with just one common trend.
Table 8. Cointegration vectors (matrix β).
Coint. Eq: CointEq1 CointEq2 CointEq3 CointEq4
BRENT 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.13
(std.err.) (0.164) (0.150) (0.153) (0.178)
APX -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EEX 0.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00
EXAA 0.00 0.00 -1.00 0.00
POWER 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
Constant -0.15 -0.07 -0.07 -0.54
By estimating the cointegrated system we imposed just-identifying
restrictions to facilitate the interpretation of the results. The esti-
mated cointegration vectors are shown in Table 8. Since data are in
logarithm, the ﬁrst row of the matrix β may be interpreted as the
long-run elasticity of the prices of, respectively, APX, EEX, AXAA,
Powernext with respect of the price of Brent (in Euro)8. Using De
Vany and Walls’s (1999) terminology, if all the coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst
row of the matrix β were ones, then we would have strong integration
among electricity markets and between the electricity markets and the
oil markets. Strong integration is equivalent to the absence of long run
of arbitrage opportunities when “trading” on median electricity and oil
prices. We imposed the strong integration restrictions and the likeli-
hood ratio (LR) test could not refuse the null hypothesis at any usual
level of signiﬁcance (p =0 .16).
We estimated the ECM again imposing strong integration to compare
the speed of adjustments of the electricity prices to a shock in the oil
prices. The generalized impulse response functions are depicted in
Figure 5.
The adjustments are rather slow for all time series: half life is circa
four weeks. APX and Powernext tend to react a bit more gradually.
In order to check for the robustness of the previous results, we es-
timated a system of four regressions, where each electricity price time
series (in log) was regressed on a constant and the Euro-Brent prices
time series:
(4) logyt = α + β logxt + εt
8This is true if we suppose that oil prices inﬂuence electricity prices but not vice
versa.DEREGULATED WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES IN EUROPE 23









Figure 5. Generalized impulse response functions of
the electricity prices to a positive shock in oil prices.
with yt vector of weekly median electricity prices, xt Euro-Brent prices
time series, α and β vector of regression coeﬃcients and εt vector I(0)
process. The system was estimated using the generalized method of
moments (GMM) with Newey-West HAC covariance matrix estimator,
and the strong integration hypothesis was tested by means of a Wald
type statistic. Again, the strong integration hypothesis could not be
rejected at any usual level of signiﬁcance (p =0 .13).
An even stronger form of market integration holds if: i) strong in-
tegration holds and ii) all the long run ratios of electricity prices of
diﬀerent markets equal one. De Vany and Walls (1999) call this per-
fect integration of the electricity markets. This assumption holds if all
the elements of α in system (4) are equal. The hypothesis of perfect
integration was tested using, again, a Wald type statistic, but the null
was strongly rejected. Indeed, the long run energy price level tends to
be higher in the APX market, than in EXAA, than in EEX, than in
Powernext (this being the actual ranking).
5. Concluding comments
This paper analyses for the ﬁrst time the interdependency existing
in the dynamics of prices formed in four major European electricity
markets (Germany, France, Austria, Netherlands). We conducted a
multivariate dynamic analysis of weekly median prices and our results
question the most commonly reported ﬁnding of mean reversion and,
implicitly, of no integration of European prices. On the contrary, our
tests indicated the presence of strong integration (but not perfect in-
tegration) among the four markets and the existence of a common
trend among electricity prices. This means that there are no long-run
arbitrage opportunities We found that this common trend is in turn
cointegrated with the oil price. The latter result appears to be relevant
also in the context of the discussion of eﬃcient hedging instruments to
be used by medium-long term investors.24 B. BOSCO, L. PARISIO, M. PELAGATTI, F. BALDI
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